1. A national state, often referred to as a modern state, is the prevalent form of governance in today’s world. The emergence of nation-states can be largely attributed to the Peace of Westphalia treaty. This treaty acknowledged and affirmed the right of the contracting parties to determine their own fate independently, mutually agreeing not to interfere in each other’s affairs. Later, it expanded to become a model and basis for international legal rules, marking a significant political aspect of modernity. Its outcome led to the decline of the Roman Empire as a political and religious model, paving the way for political realism to guide countries’ foreign policies. The diminishing influence of the papacy and the religious element allowed national interests and security to be clearly defined, serving as guiding principles for the foreign policies of subsequent national states. In addition to the transformation of previous subjects into citizens of national states, the Christian community also evolved into distinct nations within the framework of nation-states, thereby broadening the scope of national governance. It is evident that the issue wasn’t solely about the treaty; rather, it emerged from new understandings that modern Europeans were beginning to grasp. This understanding of the nation gradually expanded and evolved in response to the need to address subsequent issues. Health and education policies, legal systems, national armies, and more necessitated a new framework and presented different possibilities. Furthermore, significant advancements in technology and communication, such as roads, printing, telegraphs, and later, the telephone, played a crucial role. Trade expanded further, enhancing people’s understanding of fellow citizens in other regions. In contrast to previous armies, national armies brought together individuals from various places in a cohesive manner. This required both education and the creation of a different self-understanding. In summary, the special efficiency of national states in countries that adopted national state facilitated rapid renewal, even though the concept of the national state itself stemmed from a modern understanding.
2. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the United States launched military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s state swiftly lost their ability to resist, paving the way for the emergence of new administrations. Yet, the media frequently highlights America’s perceived failures in these regions, even predating the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. The critical question arises: where did these efforts falter? The situation in Afghanistan provides a clear illustration. The Afghan people lacked a cohesive national identity both before and after the American intervention. This absence of a shared national identity led to the crumbling of any institution established in Afghanistan, however limited its establishment may have been. The fleeing of well-equipped Afghan army forces in the face of the Taliban made it evident that they lacked a unified national identity. While America could construct physical infrastructure in Afghanistan, instilling a sense of national identity proved elusive. National identity naturally arises within a society, enabling the potential for modern nation-state living. In its absence, countries often fall back into tribal rivalries or embrace Islamic fundamentalism, resembling a community of faith rather than a unified nation. It’s apparent that this issue extends beyond Afghanistan. Pakistan, for instance, was established on the premise of a distinct Muslim identity separate from India, yet it struggles to attain a unified national identity. Dependence on a corrupt army to maintain order is a testament to this struggle. In Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, the absence of national understanding is evident.
Even proponents of national sovereignty in these regions have found it challenging to generate meaningful outcomes, often resorting to hostility. The prevailing perspective suggests that the Middle East and Central Asia face a deficit of true national states. In the absence of a cohesive national state, the future of citizenship and democracy appears bleak, stalling the efforts of democrats due to a lack of foundational support to build upon.
3. National revolutions stem from the development of a shared national understanding. In the case of America, the completion of the American national understanding empowered them to successfully resist English rule. The distinctive political structure in America was profoundly influenced by their collective national identity, allowing them to meticulously address their specific national issues and articulate their framework. A similar analysis can be applied to other revolutions, such as in France, where returning soldiers from war felt a sense of ineffectiveness shaped by their war experiences. This ineffectiveness also had a distinct national aspect. The French, in particular, often compared themselves to England, perceiving England’s progress as superior. This comparison begged the question: why hadn’t the “French nation” progressed as much as the “English nation”? Voltaire lamented the lack of intellectual nurturing in France comparable to the extent seen in England, partly due to the persistent presence of the Catholic Church in French society. This led to considerations about the need for the French national state to curb the influence of the Catholic Church in their society. In discussing France and Rousseau’s ideas, much has been deliberated regarding public will and its relation to national will. Revolutions, from a national perspective, can be categorized into different generations. It’s evident that a revolution, as a transformation where citizens oppose the established political structure, necessitates a collective identity among them. This necessity may irk hardline liberal intellectuals who question the desirability of any revolution. However, while all revolutions possess nationalistic elements from a certain perspective, the collective identity may not be exclusively national; it could target a specific class or religion. Subsequent turns and crises, like the Soviet state during the war, witnessed significant events that intensified nationalist discourse. After the October Revolution in 1917, although left-wing intellectuals were initially inclined to declare the end of national revolutions, nationalistic aspects quickly resurfaced in the generation of left-wing revolutions. Apart from issues like Chinese socialism, the most significant revolutions, involving multiple countries, were the independence movements of colonial countries, prominently advocating a nationalistic stance. It’s evident that these national understandings were not uniform and homogenous at any given stage, resulting in significantly varied outcomes.
4. I have no intention of wading into the debate on whether Iran constitutes a unified nation in this series of writings. From my standpoint, the matter is clear, and I won’t belabor it. However, the crux here lies in the fact that political transformation typically originates from the grassroots—those who perceive themselves as a cohesive “unified nation” and emphasize this collective identity. Even various forms of developmental elitism are deeply influenced by the national understanding of intellectuals. Japan serves as a prime example, and within Iran, significant instances from the era of Abbas Mirza resonate.
However, developmental elitism, driven by radical changes often borrowed from foreign models, brings about unintended consequences. It relies on extreme alterations typically imitated from other nations.
Societies thrust into rapid, fundamental changes they haven’t previously experienced tend to exhibit strong reactions, occasionally fostering fundamentalism within the middle classes due to the loss of their previous social and economic standing.
With this preface, let’s delve into the 1979 revolution in Iran. During the period between the Constitutional Revolution and the 1979 revolution, Iranian intellectuals were under the sway of the prevalent anti-colonial nationalist ideology in the region. Consequently, the initial confrontations gave rise to two distinct generations: the first composed of nationalist intellectuals, followed by the second generation. It’s important to note that the left-right dichotomy, as often seen elsewhere, is not particularly relevant to Iranians in this context. Instead, the issue revolves around different strands of nationalism. For instance, Seyyed Hasan Taghizadeh, despite his association with the social democrats, held sway in the Republic faction but later faced explicit criticism from anti-colonialists.
It’s disheartening to observe that a nation never subjected to colonization often falls prey to a form of misguided nationalism, historically yielding adverse repercussions. Perhaps, this aspect should be contemplated within the context of the nationalization of the oil industry and the events of 1953. What emerges is an intriguing pattern: states tend to bolster a specific brand of nationalism in response to crises, a course of action that invariably paves the way for revolution. Notably, both Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah voiced dissatisfaction with the oil contract, actively fomenting this discontent within society. This catalytic role played a crucial part in the ascent of Mohammad Mossadegh, a rise that was tacitly sanctioned by the Shah.
The subsequent coup represented a pivotal crisis for Mohammad Reza Shah. Evidently, within the framework of nationalism, an internal conflict emerged as the driving force. However, the subsequent attempts by the existing structure to resolve this conflict proved futile and only served to fuel ideological fervor, ultimately contributing to the revolution. Yet, labeling the 1979 revolution as a wholly national event proves challenging. Its leader consistently voiced opposition to nationalism. The ensuing political system, despite adopting the nomenclature of a republic, unmistakably showcased a decline in the notion of a national state to the point where one could argue for the absence of a truly national state in Iran.
5. The Islamic Republic grapples with profound conflicts concerning its approach to national governance. According to its fundamental law, the supreme leader can be a non-citizen residing outside Iran, and does not require election by Iranians. The concept of citizenship is fundamentally at odds with the Islamic Republic’s ideology, which primarily views its role as supporting Shia globally and, secondarily, Muslims worldwide. Consequently, foreign policy is driven more by ideological considerations than by national interests and security imperatives. The Islamic Republic consistently challenges the validity of the nation-state order and emphasizes the supreme role of the leader of the Islamic community. There have been concerted efforts to redefine the Islamic community, superseding the notion of a nation. This nascent structure was fueled by potent ideological forces, rendering it seemingly uncontrollable. It adeptly dismissed potent rivals, particularly nationalists and leftists. The Iran-Iraq war, however, revealed the limitations of a non-national approach, making it clear that victory in war necessitated a unifying national stance. Initial efforts proved ineffective, prompting a heightened effort to create a Shia-national ideology to address the crises stemming from the war.
Another notable shift was the deceleration, if not a significant halt, in the dismantling of military structures. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) endeavored to emulate the conventional army.
Furthermore, a notable emphasis was placed on asserting national interests and security requirements. Political realism repeatedly pressed the established system to align more closely with the West and Israel, akin to a pattern seen in the national state’s approach during World War II in the Soviet Union. The third aspect involved addressing the challenge Abbas Mirza was facing: the imperative was now to produce cannons and rifles. Consequently, universities were reopened, and efforts to reinvigorate military industries intensified. Dafus, a pivotal military academy, was replicated, and later, adjustments were made to the school curriculum. Reading pre-Islamic history no longer incurred disdain; it gained acceptance. In the absence of a dominant nationalistic force, the existing structure continued to function.
The outcome took many by surprise in 1997. The conflict that arose in that year compelled the state to embrace nationalism, a transformative move that would, in subsequent times, fuel revolution and coup in any state unable to reconcile itself. This marked the onset of the endeavor to equate the nuclear issue with the oil industry. Later, other dimensions were pursued, prompting an analysis of issues through the lens of political realism. Promoting political realism, while disarming highly ideological reformists, laid the foundation for a new approach in Iranian politics, where national interests and national security assumed central importance.
6. In 2009, a clash emerged between two groups who now identified strongly with nationalism, even if they were not initially aware of it. Mir-Hossein Mousavi symbolized the war faction, while Ahmadinejad sought to reframe the nuclear issue as a matter of national importance. This shift led to a decline in religiosity within both factions, occurring at different times and to varying extents. This recurring pattern is evident: when confronted with crises, the state and its sub-currents often bolster nationalism to transcend their challenges. However, if they fail to align with its requisites, it tends to escalate conflicts.
Ahmadinejad’s approach revealed a recognition that society was experiencing a surge of nationalism, although his attempt to engage with it was somewhat misguided—representing a distinct stage in understanding nationalism. There should ideally be a balance between the agent and the content. Despite this, the state failed to grasp the essence of the matter. Initially, during the early days of the revolution, it wasn’t necessary to proclaim: “If we don’t combat ISIS in Syria now, we’ll inevitably confront it in Tehran later.” While this opposition could be entirely justified on ideological grounds, a new analytical framework needed to be presented.
Apart from the persistent issue stemming from the rise of the Taliban, a crucial understanding emerged: Islamic fundamentalism posed a threat to both the national state and national security. Although the state had permitted critique of Sunni fundamentalism, its interpretation of ISIS diverged from society’s interpretation. Society was finding its own path, and as a result, the established forms of fundamentalism in Iran were assigned new meanings; even acid attacks in Isfahan underwent reevaluation. Society now sought a fresh interpretation of national security, a need that the state failed to address. This conflict escalated continually and peaked in November 2019 with the Ukrainian plane incident.
In the first instance, people were anxious about the jeopardy to their economic livelihoods, and in the second, they weren’t just protesters—they were citizens who sensed the danger and recognized the void in national security. This gap in national security wasn’t merely due to the rigidity or inefficiency of a portion of the structure; it was inherent to the structure itself.
The gap underscored the absence of a national state, and this absence was starkly highlighted by the tragic killing of a young girl who had come to Tehran with the simple wish of visiting the Nature Bridge. The fuel for the national revolution was now complete.
7. Despite these considerations, the notion of a national state remained ambiguous. Iranians grappled with accepting that their system lagged behind the vast majority of countries worldwide. This realization induced a puzzling paradox: on one hand, it deflated national pride, and on the other, it questioned the fundamental right to determine destiny—a pillar of nationalism. If every nation has the right to choose its governance, what was the fundamental purpose of the 1979 revolution? This paradoxical understanding placed the locus of conflict precisely in February 1979.
It’s important to note that this issue transcended mere political structural preferences and delved into an attempt to digest the half-century of history. The intensity and magnitude of the matter surpassed a simple political change. On one side, it delved into redefining and re-explaining the Shia element in national identity, while on the other, it spotlighted the governance dynamics of other Shia-majority countries. Given the intricacy and wide-ranging implications, along with the pre-existing ambiguity, forging this new understanding was a daunting task.
Hence, responses such as viewing the 1979 revolution as a rebellion that needed suppression or claiming it was stolen, while inadequate in addressing the problem comprehensively, became the focal points of debate and conflict. Until a specific answer to the preceding dilemma could be reached, a concrete political mechanism could not be established. Each political mechanism had to grapple with the problem of the absence of a national state and delineate what constituted a national state—each answer necessitated solving prior quandaries.
Within this vacuum, the revolutionary energy endured, but its trajectory was lost. Consequently, a society grappling with the absence of a clear formula felt immobilized, emphasizing that the present was the opportune moment for change, not some indefinite future day. Each vision of the future dictated its own path, and every differing approach bred conflict.
8. In the final days of his life and during the initial days of the 2022 protests, Seyed Javad Tabatabai interpreted the revolution within the revolution in relation to recent years’ protests. This interpretation can be examined from two interrelated aspects: firstly, the revolution in the sense of reverting everything to its original essence, and secondly, Fichte’s interpretation of Hegelian dialectics (thesis, antithesis, synthesis). In this context, the initial thesis statement, negated in the antithesis, gives birth to the new idea of synthesis.
From this viewpoint, the revolution unfolding in the opposite direction of the 1979 revolution isn’t necessarily aimed at exactly reinstating the conditions as they were before 1979. Instead, it’s about restoring the concepts to their rightful places. In this light, the emergence of both historical forces of 1979 and its negation will continue to coexist until society comprehends the changes that were necessary during the pre-February 1979 era.
However, the essence of the revolution isn’t solely confined to ideas. The material determination of the revolution, in any form, is a prominent and complex issue, although both are interconnected. The forces driving political change are those that perceive benefits from the establishment of a national state and the advantages it brings. Hence, it’s crucial to reiterate that certain individuals and groups, intending to be agents of change in 2022, fear the repercussions of change.
The national state isn’t meant to solve all the world’s problems, and addressing these concerns lies within the ordinary framework, where issues can be resolved within the scope of the national state.
Involving those who might suffer losses from the national state in the change process can disrupt rather than expand the subject. When the concept of revolution intertwines with nationalism and individuals brand nationalism as fascism while considering themselves revolutionary, they engage in a fundamental contradiction, either stemming from dishonesty or ignorance, and introduce this contradiction into the process of change, to the extent possible.
9. Political change can manifest through diverse methods and approaches. The vacuum left by conflict or the absence of a national state can be filled with an authoritarian or democratic regime, involving maximum or minimal participation of governing forces. It can transpire through coup d’état, Thermidor, or even violent revolutionary means. However, within this spectrum of conflicts, the fundamental principles of international norms and the awareness of citizenship and rights within a nation cannot be disregarded.
The national comprehension of any crisis or ongoing event is shaped by the prevailing context, as seen in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccine shortages. These circumstances underscore the absence of a national state, accentuated by the closure of Iran’s borders from Afghanistan to Sistan and Baluchistan. The Baluchi farmer, benefiting from this water, keenly perceives the issue of the absence of a national state. This void encompasses both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. More individuals realize that the regular form of state’s relationship with the people should be different from the existing one, which they find inadequate.
With the diminishing significance of oil rents, this void cannot be replaced by something else. The material circumstances necessitate a shift in perception regarding the absence of a national state, rather than the reverse. It’s not nationalism that is expected to generate something. The state of emergency arising from the abnormal situation has led to the emergence of nationalism as a solution. The perceived intensification of nationalism is a direct outcome of fundamentalism, the water crisis, experiences with COVID-19, the Iran nuclear deal’s failure, and similar events. Nationalism acts as a vessel that nations construct to navigate through such crises.
10. The absence of a national state implies another perception. If there is no framework resembling a national state, obstructing the realization of such a state, it is akin to occupation. Simultaneously, the narrative in the material context and the subconscious perception of citizens continues. The national understanding determines whether something is seen as occupation or not. The severity of the situation can be grim and unforgiving. However, concurrently, as understanding expands, the degrees of violence may escalate or diminish.
The support and unity of a significant portion of society with Majidreza Rahnavard and Kian Hosseini are indicators of something that, contrary to the prevalent state view and satellite network advertisements, has not solidified. The state cannot impede this process because it fails to grasp the essence of the matter. Consequently, it continues to rely on advertising tactics that were effective before but are no longer so. Its advertising strategies adhere to a reformist framework, utilizing figures like Roshanfekr or Shahbazi as TV presenters, without comprehending the root issue.
Ironically, the state’s adaptation of its approach in response to demands against nationalism, whether in the form of Islamic globalism or ethnonationalism, only exacerbates the situation, adding fuel to the fire and intensifying the problem. More actors realize that the existing structure has become a crisis-instigating and destabilizing factor for the country.
However, any approach pursued by agents of change must align with the average desires of society. In effecting change, caution is necessary as even the desires of change supporters may not align with society’s true average.
Hence, being proactive involves considering the extensive evaluation of the distance from potential change. In the struggle for change, the optimal formula is one that resonates positively with the majority of influential actors, diverging from the prevailing state stance.
11. Since the onset of the protests in September 2022, the absence of a national state became palpable to the protesters. This void was perceived in two ways: through a nationalistic lens and an occupation perspective. The escalation in the citizens’ rhetoric was a prominent indicator of this divide, crystallizing in nationalist movements as a rift within the homeland and betrayal to it. Consequently, confrontation ensued at its most fervent.
The issue likely revolved around the legitimacy of violence. A national state represents a form of governance where its monopoly on violence is deemed legitimate. In the understanding of the absence of a national state, this monopoly becomes illegitimate, altering the equation of legitimacy. The equation transformed resistance into occupation; the violence of the resistance became legitimate, while the violence of the occupier became illegitimate.
However, this framework encountered several halts and did not evolve into a self-reinforcing cycle. Firstly, opposition forces failed to grasp what was unfolding, mirroring the regime’s misunderstanding. Some mistakenly believed that any form of violence was deemed legitimate by society. They were bewildered by the lack of societal reaction to Habib Osayvad’s execution, which ostensibly appealed to human rights. They didn’t fully comprehend the whole equation.
Another faction within the opposition, although identifying as nationalists, was metaphorically referred to as “skinless” in the game. And yet, another faction viewed themselves as nationalists but were averse to the imagery of violence. It was indicative of an ongoing transformation, alluded to by the unanimous reference of the protesters to the Iranian national myth of Zahhak and Fereydoun. It was within this framework that the image of the ancient Persian figure Kaveh the Derafsh Kaviani reemerged in society. Although from a public perspective, the lion and sun held greater importance in nationalism, enjoying a more entrenched position.
The crux here is that amid the protests, the role of action, opinion, idea, and substance was discernible side by side. If the protesters protested symbolically, they also engaged in discussions and debates about the reasons and motivations behind it. They vehemently discredited each other, ultimately arriving at a relatively coherent perception of national identity. The regime and opposition leaders’ inability to grasp the dynamics of the events delayed this process for months.
Masih Alinjad paid little attention to why her recommendation for attacking Iranian embassies worldwide was not accepted by the protesters. Similarly, supporters of Hamed Esmaeilion failed to comprehend the unique aspect that characterized him, aligning with one of the most crucial archetypes of Iranian myths, causing them to lose the readily available position. The political forces around Mr. Pahlavi also, after years of negative theorizing about nationalism, took a while to somewhat (though not fully) understand the nature of the event. Since 2017, they had attempted to translate the credibility of the slogan “Rezashah, Roohe shad” (Reza Shah, may your soul be happy) into a slogan that carried political criticism, but they were unsuccessful. Their chance arrived after a six-year hiatus. Eventually, they realized that their society was in the process of producing a national understanding rather than embracing their own understanding.
It’s surprising that they were also moving away from the acceptance of a simple reactive fact: that society was active, and nationalism was not merely an elite form (which is not necessarily positive).
What the society sought were agents who could articulate their understanding and effect change in a manner that produced a post-change future (a national revolution) and a national state. In the absence of this articulation ability, the opponents’ characterization of the diaspora’s understanding of the national diminished.
It should be noted that this reduction in influence is almost certain, although it should not be mistaken for a complete negation of their role. Perhaps this marked another stage in the national understanding in Iran. From the Qajar period to the present, finding the path to modernity was made possible through collaboration between Iranian immigrants and Iranians within the country. However, over time, the differentiation between Iranians inside and outside the country, in terms of modernity and its requirements, diminished each year and sometimes reversed.
A few crucial points were pivotal in this regard: Firstly, the initial generations of the translation movement in Iran were facilitated through the efforts of immigrants. Linguistics was predominantly the realm of those living outside the country. However, this distinction lessened. Secondly, the disparity in education levels between Iranians inside and outside the country decreased annually. The final point was that with the increase in the number of immigrants and the prominence of immigration and identity issues in the destination country, many of them turned to postmodern ideas, seeking solace in postmodern ideologies that contradicted the aspiration to create an Enlightenment period within the country.
Ultimately, one of the most prominent and visible divides in these protests was the internal and external dichotomy, exemplified by a notable example: a weak journalist who theorizes about his profession and its likes, and Iranian actors in the streets embodying those theories. The critical aspect isn’t this division and the amusing claims associated with it, but the significant outcome. Iranians endeavored to derive a modern understanding through the lens of their own tangible and material issues, rather than considering the lives of Iranians outside the country and their identity and migration problems.
12. Many were astounded by how NIAC lost its legitimacy and was perceived as a traitor in the public sphere. On the other hand, advocating for the lifting of sanctions evolved into a failed endeavor. The crux here is that only a nationalist perspective can lead to such a reversal in public perception. If there is no national state but there exists a nation, then the ruling power is an occupying state, and the state’s control over national assets is illegitimate. Consequently, all prior arguments for advocating the lifting of sanctions easily fell short.
The state and reformists attributed this change to media propaganda because they couldn’t accept that something deeper had shifted. The perception of the absence of a national state naturally upends situations for those who comprehend it. Yet again, it was this perception that opponents couldn’t grasp. Instead, they ascribed this reversal to their own efforts. This misguided approach made them believe they could make society believe anything, and the outcome was catastrophic.
The essence here is that absence is coupled with desire. In the political aspirations of Iranians, a national state is anticipated to emerge. A state capable of safeguarding their national interests and security against threats, not one that, through a semantic reversal, censures believers in the national state for jeopardizing national security.
My endeavor in this series of writings was to briefly elucidate that nationalism has specific and significant requisites both in the path of change and in the post-change future. A simple example of the post-change future is citizenship rights. Citizens of national states possess specific rights that cannot be violated for any reason. A society that has embraced a national understanding upholds its citizenship rights.
From this standpoint, both the hijab issue and the freedom of lifestyle choices are deeply connected to nationalism. It’s improbable that a nation would endorse the assertions of individuals who, under the guise of nationalism, undermine protests in these domains.
Furthermore, nationalism, which brought about the constitutional revolution a century ago and subsequently modern jurisprudence, cannot be framed in a manner that violates citizens’ fundamental rights for any reason. The second point concerns the method of change: nationalism is a potent driving force that can forcefully remove obstacles in its path. It’s true that this warns of serious dangers in its unbridled use, but when confronted with persistent crises and unresolved deadlocks, one cannot evade employing this driving force. Be it good or bad nationalism, it justifies necessary violence. Hence, it stands as the most revolutionary ideology of the last three centuries.
Nationalism, by necessity, inclines towards secularism and at times demands a stern secularism. Ultimately, nationalism provides the arena for the emergence of unknown figures who swiftly elevate themselves from anonymity to the highest echelons of power under revolutionary conditions. It’s intriguing that someone like me, who holds conservative ideas, should remind us of these inevitable requisites. However, tradition, in its most fundamental form, is about learning from realities that have occurred repeatedly. “The ball is in play, and here is the field.”
2. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the United States launched military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s government swiftly lost their ability to resist, paving the way for the emergence of new administrations. Yet, the media frequently highlights America’s perceived failures in these regions, even predating the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. The critical question arises: where did these efforts falter? The situation in Afghanistan provides a clear illustration. The Afghan people lacked a cohesive national identity both before and after the American intervention. This absence of a shared national identity led to the crumbling of any institution established in Afghanistan, however limited its establishment may have been. The fleeing of well-equipped Afghan army forces in the face of the Taliban made it evident that they lacked a unified national identity. While America could construct physical infrastructure in Afghanistan, instilling a sense of national identity proved elusive. National identity naturally arises within a society, enabling the potential for modern nation-state living. In its absence, countries often fall back into tribal rivalries or embrace Islamic fundamentalism, resembling a community of faith rather than a unified nation. It’s apparent that this issue extends beyond Afghanistan. Pakistan, for instance, was established on the premise of a distinct Muslim identity separate from India, yet it struggles to attain a unified national identity. Dependence on a corrupt army to maintain order is a testament to this struggle. In Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, the absence of national understanding is evident.
Even proponents of national sovereignty in these regions have found it challenging to generate meaningful outcomes, often resorting to hostility. The prevailing perspective suggests that the Middle East and Central Asia face a deficit of true national governments. In the absence of a cohesive national government, the future of citizenship and democracy appears bleak, stalling the efforts of democrats due to a lack of foundational support to build upon.
3. National revolutions stem from the development of a shared national understanding. In the case of America, the completion of the American national understanding empowered them to successfully resist English rule. The distinctive political structure in America was profoundly influenced by their collective national identity, allowing them to meticulously address their specific national issues and articulate their framework. A similar analysis can be applied to other revolutions, such as in France, where returning soldiers from war felt a sense of ineffectiveness shaped by their war experiences. This ineffectiveness also had a distinct national aspect. The French, in particular, often compared themselves to England, perceiving England’s progress as superior. This comparison begged the question: why hadn’t the “French nation” progressed as much as the “English nation”? Voltaire lamented the lack of intellectual nurturing in France comparable to the extent seen in England, partly due to the persistent presence of the Catholic Church in French society. This led to considerations about the need for the French national government to curb the influence of the Catholic Church in their society. In discussing France and Rousseau’s ideas, much has been deliberated regarding public will and its relation to national will. Revolutions, from a national perspective, can be categorized into different generations. It’s evident that a revolution, as a transformation where citizens oppose the established political structure, necessitates a collective identity among them. This necessity may irk hardline liberal intellectuals who question the desirability of any revolution. However, while all revolutions possess nationalistic elements from a certain perspective, the collective identity may not be exclusively national; it could target a specific class or religion. Subsequent turns and crises, like the Soviet government during the war, witnessed significant events that intensified nationalist discourse. After the October Revolution in 1917, although left-wing intellectuals were initially inclined to declare the end of national revolutions, nationalistic aspects quickly resurfaced in the generation of left-wing revolutions. Apart from issues like Chinese socialism, the most significant revolutions, involving multiple countries, were the independence movements of colonial countries, prominently advocating a nationalistic stance. It’s evident that these national understandings were not uniform and homogenous at any given stage, resulting in significantly varied outcomes.
4. I have no intention of wading into the debate on whether Iran constitutes a unified nation in this series of writings. From my standpoint, the matter is clear, and I won’t belabor it. However, the crux here lies in the fact that political transformation typically originates from the grassroots—those who perceive themselves as a cohesive “unified nation” and emphasize this collective identity. Even various forms of developmental elitism are deeply influenced by the national understanding of intellectuals. Japan serves as a prime example, and within Iran, significant instances from the era of Abbas Mirza resonate.
However, developmental elitism, driven by radical changes often borrowed from foreign models, brings about unintended consequences. It relies on extreme alterations typically imitated from other nations.
Societies thrust into rapid, fundamental changes they haven’t previously experienced tend to exhibit strong reactions, occasionally fostering fundamentalism within the middle classes due to the loss of their previous social and economic standing.
With this preface, let’s delve into the 1979 revolution in Iran. During the period between the Constitutional Revolution and the 1979 revolution, Iranian intellectuals were under the sway of the prevalent anti-colonial nationalist ideology in the region. Consequently, the initial confrontations gave rise to two distinct generations: the first composed of nationalist intellectuals, followed by the second generation. It’s important to note that the left-right dichotomy, as often seen elsewhere, is not particularly relevant to Iranians in this context. Instead, the issue revolves around different strands of nationalism. For instance, Seyyed Hasan Taghizadeh, despite his association with the social democrats, held sway in the Republic faction but later faced explicit criticism from anti-colonialists.
It’s disheartening to observe that a nation never subjected to colonization often falls prey to a form of misguided nationalism, historically yielding adverse repercussions. Perhaps, this aspect should be contemplated within the context of the nationalization of the oil industry and the events of 1953. What emerges is an intriguing pattern: governments tend to bolster a specific brand of nationalism in response to crises, a course of action that invariably paves the way for revolution. Notably, both Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah voiced dissatisfaction with the oil contract, actively fomenting this discontent within society. This catalytic role played a crucial part in the ascent of Mohammad Mossadegh, a rise that was tacitly sanctioned by the Shah.
The subsequent coup represented a pivotal crisis for Mohammad Reza Shah. Evidently, within the framework of nationalism, an internal conflict emerged as the driving force. However, the subsequent attempts by the existing structure to resolve this conflict proved futile and only served to fuel ideological fervor, ultimately contributing to the revolution. Yet, labeling the 1979 revolution as a wholly national event proves challenging. Its leader consistently voiced opposition to nationalism. The ensuing political system, despite adopting the nomenclature of a republic, unmistakably showcased a decline in the notion of a national government to the point where one could argue for the absence of a truly national government in Iran.
5. The Islamic Republic grapples with profound conflicts concerning its approach to national governance. According to its fundamental law, the supreme leader can be a non-citizen residing outside Iran, and does not require election by Iranians. The concept of citizenship is fundamentally at odds with the Islamic Republic’s ideology, which primarily views its role as supporting Shia globally and, secondarily, Muslims worldwide. Consequently, foreign policy is driven more by ideological considerations than by national interests and security imperatives. The Islamic Republic consistently challenges the validity of the nation-state order and emphasizes the supreme role of the leader of the Islamic community. There have been concerted efforts to redefine the Islamic community, superseding the notion of a nation. This nascent structure was fueled by potent ideological forces, rendering it seemingly uncontrollable. It adeptly dismissed potent rivals, particularly nationalists and leftists. The Iran-Iraq war, however, revealed the limitations of a non-national approach, making it clear that victory in war necessitated a unifying national stance. Initial efforts proved ineffective, prompting a heightened effort to create a Shia-national ideology to address the crises stemming from the war.
Another notable shift was the deceleration, if not a significant halt, in the dismantling of military structures. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) endeavored to emulate the conventional army.
Furthermore, a notable emphasis was placed on asserting national interests and security requirements. Political realism repeatedly pressed the established system to align more closely with the West and Israel, akin to a pattern seen in the national government’s approach during World War II in the Soviet Union. The third aspect involved addressing the challenge Abbas Mirza was facing: the imperative was now to produce cannons and rifles. Consequently, universities were reopened, and efforts to reinvigorate military industries intensified. Dafus, a pivotal military academy, was replicated, and later, adjustments were made to the school curriculum. Reading pre-Islamic history no longer incurred disdain; it gained acceptance. In the absence of a dominant nationalistic force, the existing structure continued to function.
The outcome took many by surprise in 1997. The conflict that arose in that year compelled the government to embrace nationalism, a transformative move that would, in subsequent times, fuel revolution and coup in any government unable to reconcile itself. This marked the onset of the endeavor to equate the nuclear issue with the oil industry. Later, other dimensions were pursued, prompting an analysis of issues through the lens of political realism. Promoting political realism, while disarming highly ideological reformists, laid the foundation for a new approach in Iranian politics, where national interests and national security assumed central importance.
6. In 2009, a clash emerged between two groups who now identified strongly with nationalism, even if they were not initially aware of it. Mir-Hossein Mousavi symbolized the war faction, while Ahmadinejad sought to reframe the nuclear issue as a matter of national importance. This shift led to a decline in religiosity within both factions, occurring at different times and to varying extents. This recurring pattern is evident: when confronted with crises, the government and its sub-currents often bolster nationalism to transcend their challenges. However, if they fail to align with its requisites, it tends to escalate conflicts.
Ahmadinejad’s approach revealed a recognition that society was experiencing a surge of nationalism, although his attempt to engage with it was somewhat misguided—representing a distinct stage in understanding nationalism. There should ideally be a balance between the agent and the content. Despite this, the government failed to grasp the essence of the matter. Initially, during the early days of the revolution, it wasn’t necessary to proclaim: “If we don’t combat ISIS in Syria now, we’ll inevitably confront it in Tehran later.” While this opposition could be entirely justified on ideological grounds, a new analytical framework needed to be presented.
Apart from the persistent issue stemming from the rise of the Taliban, a crucial understanding emerged: Islamic fundamentalism posed a threat to both the national government and national security. Although the government had permitted critique of Sunni fundamentalism, its interpretation of ISIS diverged from society’s interpretation. Society was finding its own path, and as a result, the established forms of fundamentalism in Iran were assigned new meanings; even acid attacks in Isfahan underwent reevaluation. Society now sought a fresh interpretation of national security, a need that the government failed to address. This conflict escalated continually and peaked in November 2019 with the Ukrainian plane incident.
In the first instance, people were anxious about the jeopardy to their economic livelihoods, and in the second, they weren’t just protesters—they were citizens who sensed the danger and recognized the void in national security. This gap in national security wasn’t merely due to the rigidity or inefficiency of a portion of the structure; it was inherent to the structure itself.
The gap underscored the absence of a national government, and this absence was starkly highlighted by the tragic killing of a young girl who had come to Tehran with the simple wish of visiting the Nature Bridge. The fuel for the national revolution was now complete.
7. Despite these considerations, the notion of a national government remained ambiguous. Iranians grappled with accepting that their system lagged behind the vast majority of countries worldwide. This realization induced a puzzling paradox: on one hand, it deflated national pride, and on the other, it questioned the fundamental right to determine destiny—a pillar of nationalism. If every nation has the right to choose its governance, what was the fundamental purpose of the 1979 revolution? This paradoxical understanding placed the locus of conflict precisely in February 1979.
It’s important to note that this issue transcended mere political structural preferences and delved into an attempt to digest the half-century of history. The intensity and magnitude of the matter surpassed a simple political change. On one side, it delved into redefining and re-explaining the Shia element in national identity, while on the other, it spotlighted the governance dynamics of other Shia-majority countries. Given the intricacy and wide-ranging implications, along with the pre-existing ambiguity, forging this new understanding was a daunting task.
Hence, responses such as viewing the 1979 revolution as a rebellion that needed suppression or claiming it was stolen, while inadequate in addressing the problem comprehensively, became the focal points of debate and conflict. Until a specific answer to the preceding dilemma could be reached, a concrete political mechanism could not be established. Each political mechanism had to grapple with the problem of the absence of a national government and delineate what constituted a national government—each answer necessitated solving prior quandaries.
Within this vacuum, the revolutionary energy endured, but its trajectory was lost. Consequently, a society grappling with the absence of a clear formula felt immobilized, emphasizing that the present was the opportune moment for change, not some indefinite future day. Each vision of the future dictated its own path, and every differing approach bred conflict.
8. In the final days of his life and during the initial days of the 2022 protests, Seyed Javad Tabatabai interpreted the revolution within the revolution in relation to recent years’ protests. This interpretation can be examined from two interrelated aspects: firstly, the revolution in the sense of reverting everything to its original essence, and secondly, Fichte’s interpretation of Hegelian dialectics (thesis, antithesis, synthesis). In this context, the initial thesis statement, negated in the antithesis, gives birth to the new idea of synthesis.
From this viewpoint, the revolution unfolding in the opposite direction of the 1979 revolution isn’t necessarily aimed at exactly reinstating the conditions as they were before 1979. Instead, it’s about restoring the concepts to their rightful places. In this light, the emergence of both historical forces of 1979 and its negation will continue to coexist until society comprehends the changes that were necessary during the pre-February 1979 era.
However, the essence of the revolution isn’t solely confined to ideas. The material determination of the revolution, in any form, is a prominent and complex issue, although both are interconnected. The forces driving political change are those that perceive benefits from the establishment of a national government and the advantages it brings. Hence, it’s crucial to reiterate that certain individuals and groups, intending to be agents of change in 2022, fear the repercussions of change.
The national government isn’t meant to solve all the world’s problems, and addressing these concerns lies within the ordinary framework, where issues can be resolved within the scope of the national government.
Involving those who might suffer losses from the national government in the change process can disrupt rather than expand the subject. When the concept of revolution intertwines with nationalism and individuals brand nationalism as fascism while considering themselves revolutionary, they engage in a fundamental contradiction, either stemming from dishonesty or ignorance, and introduce this contradiction into the process of change, to the extent possible.
9. Political change can manifest through diverse methods and approaches. The vacuum left by conflict or the absence of a national government can be filled with an authoritarian or democratic regime, involving maximum or minimal participation of governing forces. It can transpire through coup d’état, Thermidor, or even violent revolutionary means. However, within this spectrum of conflicts, the fundamental principles of international norms and the awareness of citizenship and rights within a nation cannot be disregarded.
The national comprehension of any crisis or ongoing event is shaped by the prevailing context, as seen in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccine shortages. These circumstances underscore the absence of a national government, accentuated by the closure of Iran’s borders from Afghanistan to Sistan and Baluchistan. The Baluchi farmer, benefiting from this water, keenly perceives the issue of the absence of a national government. This void encompasses both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. More individuals realize that the regular form of government’s relationship with the people should be different from the existing one, which they find inadequate.
With the diminishing significance of oil rents, this void cannot be replaced by something else. The material circumstances necessitate a shift in perception regarding the absence of a national government, rather than the reverse. It’s not nationalism that is expected to generate something. The state of emergency arising from the abnormal situation has led to the emergence of nationalism as a solution. The perceived intensification of nationalism is a direct outcome of fundamentalism, the water crisis, experiences with COVID-19, the Iran nuclear deal’s failure, and similar events. Nationalism acts as a vessel that nations construct to navigate through such crises.
10. The absence of a national government implies another perception. If there is no framework resembling a national government, obstructing the realization of such a government, it is akin to occupation. Simultaneously, the narrative in the material context and the subconscious perception of citizens continues. The national understanding determines whether something is seen as occupation or not. The severity of the situation can be grim and unforgiving. However, concurrently, as understanding expands, the degrees of violence may escalate or diminish.
The support and unity of a significant portion of society with Majidreza Rahnavard and Kian Hosseini are indicators of something that, contrary to the prevalent government view and satellite network advertisements, has not solidified. The government cannot impede this process because it fails to grasp the essence of the matter. Consequently, it continues to rely on advertising tactics that were effective before but are no longer so. Its advertising strategies adhere to a reformist framework, utilizing figures like Roshanfekr or Shahbazi as TV presenters, without comprehending the root issue.
Ironically, the government’s adaptation of its approach in response to demands against nationalism, whether in the form of Islamic globalism or ethnonationalism, only exacerbates the situation, adding fuel to the fire and intensifying the problem. More actors realize that the existing structure has become a crisis-instigating and destabilizing factor for the country.
However, any approach pursued by agents of change must align with the average desires of society. In effecting change, caution is necessary as even the desires of change supporters may not align with society’s true average.
Hence, being proactive involves considering the extensive evaluation of the distance from potential change. In the struggle for change, the optimal formula is one that resonates positively with the majority of influential actors, diverging from the prevailing government stance.
11. Since the onset of the protests in September 2022, the absence of a national government became palpable to the protesters. This void was perceived in two ways: through a nationalistic lens and an occupation perspective. The escalation in the citizens’ rhetoric was a prominent indicator of this divide, crystallizing in nationalist movements as a rift within the homeland and betrayal to it. Consequently, confrontation ensued at its most fervent.
The issue likely revolved around the legitimacy of violence. A national government represents a form of governance where its monopoly on violence is deemed legitimate. In the understanding of the absence of a national government, this monopoly becomes illegitimate, altering the equation of legitimacy. The equation transformed resistance into occupation; the violence of the resistance became legitimate, while the violence of the occupier became illegitimate.
However, this framework encountered several halts and did not evolve into a self-reinforcing cycle. Firstly, opposition forces failed to grasp what was unfolding, mirroring the regime’s misunderstanding. Some mistakenly believed that any form of violence was deemed legitimate by society. They were bewildered by the lack of societal reaction to Habib Osayvad’s execution, which ostensibly appealed to human rights. They didn’t fully comprehend the whole equation.
Another faction within the opposition, although identifying as nationalists, was metaphorically referred to as “skinless” in the game. And yet, another faction viewed themselves as nationalists but were averse to the imagery of violence. It was indicative of an ongoing transformation, alluded to by the unanimous reference of the protesters to the Iranian national myth of Zahhak and Fereydoun. It was within this framework that the image of the ancient Persian figure Kaveh the Derafsh Kaviani reemerged in society. Although from a public perspective, the lion and sun held greater importance in nationalism, enjoying a more entrenched position.
The crux here is that amid the protests, the role of action, opinion, idea, and substance was discernible side by side. If the protesters protested symbolically, they also engaged in discussions and debates about the reasons and motivations behind it. They vehemently discredited each other, ultimately arriving at a relatively coherent perception of national identity. The regime and opposition leaders’ inability to grasp the dynamics of the events delayed this process for months.
Masih Alinjad paid little attention to why her recommendation for attacking Iranian embassies worldwide was not accepted by the protesters. Similarly, supporters of Hamed Esmaeilion failed to comprehend the unique aspect that characterized him, aligning with one of the most crucial archetypes of Iranian myths, causing them to lose the readily available position. The political forces around Mr. Pahlavi also, after years of negative theorizing about nationalism, took a while to somewhat (though not fully) understand the nature of the event. Since 2017, they had attempted to translate the credibility of the slogan “Rezashah, Roohe shad” (Reza Shah, may your soul be happy) into a slogan that carried political criticism, but they were unsuccessful. Their chance arrived after a six-year hiatus. Eventually, they realized that their society was in the process of producing a national understanding rather than embracing their own understanding.
It’s surprising that they were also moving away from the acceptance of a simple reactive fact: that society was active, and nationalism was not merely an elite form (which is not necessarily positive).
What the society sought were agents who could articulate their understanding and effect change in a manner that produced a post-change future (a national revolution) and a national government. In the absence of this articulation ability, the opponents’ characterization of the diaspora’s understanding of the national diminished.
It should be noted that this reduction in influence is almost certain, although it should not be mistaken for a complete negation of their role. Perhaps this marked another stage in the national understanding in Iran. From the Qajar period to the present, finding the path to modernity was made possible through collaboration between Iranian immigrants and Iranians within the country. However, over time, the differentiation between Iranians inside and outside the country, in terms of modernity and its requirements, diminished each year and sometimes reversed.
A few crucial points were pivotal in this regard: Firstly, the initial generations of the translation movement in Iran were facilitated through the efforts of immigrants. Linguistics was predominantly the realm of those living outside the country. However, this distinction lessened. Secondly, the disparity in education levels between Iranians inside and outside the country decreased annually. The final point was that with the increase in the number of immigrants and the prominence of immigration and identity issues in the destination country, many of them turned to postmodern ideas, seeking solace in postmodern ideologies that contradicted the aspiration to create an Enlightenment period within the country.
Ultimately, one of the most prominent and visible divides in these protests was the internal and external dichotomy, exemplified by a notable example: a weak journalist who theorizes about his profession and its likes, and Iranian actors in the streets embodying those theories. The critical aspect isn’t this division and the amusing claims associated with it, but the significant outcome. Iranians endeavored to derive a modern understanding through the lens of their own tangible and material issues, rather than considering the lives of Iranians outside the country and their identity and migration problems.
12. Many were astounded by how NIAC lost its legitimacy and was perceived as a traitor in the public sphere. On the other hand, advocating for the lifting of sanctions evolved into a failed endeavor. The crux here is that only a nationalist perspective can lead to such a reversal in public perception. If there is no national government but there exists a nation, then the ruling power is an occupying government, and the government’s control over national assets is illegitimate. Consequently, all prior arguments for advocating the lifting of sanctions easily fell short.
The government and reformists attributed this change to media propaganda because they couldn’t accept that something deeper had shifted. The perception of the absence of a national government naturally upends situations for those who comprehend it. Yet again, it was this perception that opponents couldn’t grasp. Instead, they ascribed this reversal to their own efforts. This misguided approach made them believe they could make society believe anything, and the outcome was catastrophic.
The essence here is that absence is coupled with desire. In the political aspirations of Iranians, a national government is anticipated to emerge. A government capable of safeguarding their national interests and security against threats, not one that, through a semantic reversal, censures believers in the national government for jeopardizing national security.
My endeavor in this series of writings was to briefly elucidate that nationalism has specific and significant requisites both in the path of change and in the post-change future. A simple example of the post-change future is citizenship rights. Citizens of national governments possess specific rights that cannot be violated for any reason. A society that has embraced a national understanding upholds its citizenship rights.
From this standpoint, both the hijab issue and the freedom of lifestyle choices are deeply connected to nationalism. It’s improbable that a nation would endorse the assertions of individuals who, under the guise of nationalism, undermine protests in these domains.
Furthermore, nationalism, which brought about the constitutional revolution a century ago and subsequently modern jurisprudence, cannot be framed in a manner that violates citizens’ fundamental rights for any reason. The second point concerns the method of change: nationalism is a potent driving force that can forcefully remove obstacles in its path. It’s true that this warns of serious dangers in its unbridled use, but when confronted with persistent crises and unresolved deadlocks, one cannot evade employing this driving force. Be it good or bad nationalism, it justifies necessary violence. Hence, it stands as the most revolutionary ideology of the last three centuries.
Nationalism, by necessity, inclines towards secularism and at times demands a stern secularism. Ultimately, nationalism provides the arena for the emergence of unknown figures who swiftly elevate themselves from anonymity to the highest echelons of power under revolutionary conditions. It’s intriguing that someone like me, who holds conservative ideas, should remind us of these inevitable requisites. However, tradition, in its most fundamental form, is about learning from realities that have occurred repeatedly. “The ball is in play, and here is the field.”
